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APR 2 0 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COUR" 
UTAH 
April 20, 1992 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
33 2 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Citation of Supplemental Authorities, Timm et al. v. 
Dewsnup, Docket No. 91-0157. 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter is filed with you as Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. In the above-captioned case, since the briefs have been 
filed, two pertinent cases have come to my attention. 
1. Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Supreme Court, February 24, 1992) - collateral estoppel. 
The collateral estoppel issue in Hill v. Seattle First 
National Bank, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Supreme Court, February 24, 
1992) is nearly identical to the collateral estoppel issue in 
Dewsnup. In Hill, a counterclaimant had raised in a federal court 
proceeding the existence of an oral contract. However, the federal 
court did not consider whether there was an oral contract because 
the federal court "ruled inadmissible any evidence of oral 
representations that might establish a contract." IdL at 4. In a 
later state court proceeding, where evidence of the oral contract 
was admissible, the counterclaimant again tried to raise the same 
issue of the existence of an oral contract. This Court held that 
collateral estoppel did not preclude the counterclaimant from 
raising the issue of the oral contract in state court since "the 
federal court never reached the question of whether [there was an 
oral contract]." Id,, at 5. 
Similarly, in Dewsnup, the Dewsnups raised in bankruptcy court 
the issue of whether the Trust Deed had been paid off. However, 
under Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946), the bankruptcy court 
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gave full faith and credit to the state court decree of foreclosure 
and did not reach the underlying issue of whether the Trust Deed 
had been paid off. Just as in Hillf the Dewsnups should not be 
collaterally estopped from raising that issue in state court, where 
that issue can be considered. The collateral estoppel issue is 
briefed in the Respondents brief at pages 16-19 and in the Reply 
brief at pages 14-20. 
2. Robertson v. Gem Insurance Co., 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Court 
of Appeals, February 27, 1992) - Standard of Review. 
In Robertson v. Gem Insurance Co. , 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
(Court of Appeals, February 27, 1992), the Court of Appeals held 
that the correctness standard is the appropriate standard of review 
where a ruling is made on a question of law, even through the 
discretionary standard would otherwise apply: 
Generally, an attorney fee award is within the 
court's discretion and will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation 
omitted.] However, some of the arguments 
presented on the attorney fees issue involve 
questions of law, which we review without 
deference, for correctness. [Citation 
omitted.] 
Id. at 37. 
Similarly, in Dewsnup, the correctness standard should apply 
to a review of the trial court's denial of the Motion to Amend 
Counterclaim and the Motion to Either Reconsider and Set Aside or 
to Certify as Final, because the trial court denied both motions on 
a question of law (denying both motions on the basis of its ruling 
that the Dewsnups7 counterclaim had been implicitly disposed of). 
This issue was briefed in the Appellant's brief at pages 3-4, the 
Respondent's brief at pages 1, 16, and in the Reply brief at pages 
13-14. 
Very truly yours, 
Russell A. Cline 
RAC/aa 
cc: Michael Z. Hayes 
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes P.C. 
2180 South 1300 East #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
